Files
OpenFrame/tests/unit/lib/guest-upload-token.test.ts
T
yusufipek 00f1d430b8 fix(uploads): stop a storage hold from being dropped by whoever can name it
A reservation id was never a secret and could not have been one. An upload
token is base64url(payload) followed by its signature, so a client can read
every claim out of its own token, and the two R2 init routes hand their
reservation ids to the client outright. The asset route takes a reservation
id from the request body and deleted it on the strength of that id and the
billed user alone, and every hold an account owns is billed to the same user.

So a caller could start a Bunny upload, read the id out of the token they
were just given, quote it while attaching a one byte image or even a bare
YouTube link, and have the quota handed back while the upload carried on.
Repeat and a trial worth three gigabytes uploads as much as it likes for as
long as Bunny takes to report a figure of its own. Signing the id rather than
handing it over bought nothing, because signing is not hiding.

A hold now records what it was opened for and is only ever consumed by that
flow, so naming one is no longer enough to drop it.

Guests hold against the workspace owner's quota rather than their own and had
no way to give it back: the release was gated on being signed in. Declaring a
size and walking away cost the guest nothing and cost the owner their whole
remaining allowance for two hours. The guest grant now carries the reservation
and the declared size, bound to the Bunny video as well as to ours, so
cancelling gives the quota back and costs them the upload it stood for. What a
guest can hold without cancelling lapses in half an hour rather than two hours.

The in-transaction fallback check counted the account's Bunny storage as zero
on a Bunny upload, because the figure was only prefetched for R2 providers and
that branch was unreachable for Bunny until this PR made it reachable. On an
account whose storage is all Bunny that was a check that could not fail. It is
prefetched for every provider that can reach the fallback now.
2026-08-18 11:07:18 +03:00

110 lines
3.8 KiB
TypeScript

// The grant a share-link visitor gets for a direct upload.
//
// A guest's upload is billed to the workspace owner, not to the guest, so this
// token is the only thing tying what they declared and what they hold to the
// upload it was issued for. Two claims matter here beyond the existing subject
// binding: the provider's own video id, which is what makes releasing the hold
// on the guest's say-so safe, and the declared size, which is what the asset is
// charged until Bunny reports a figure of its own.
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import {
createGuestUploadToken,
readGuestUploadGrant,
verifyGuestUploadToken,
} from '@/lib/guest-upload-token';
const SUBJECT = {
projectId: 'project-1',
videoId: 'video-1',
intent: 'bunny' as const,
context: '203.0.113.7:public',
};
const BUNNY_VIDEO_ID = 'bunnyvideo-1-abcdefgh';
beforeEach(() => {
vi.stubEnv('GUEST_UPLOAD_TOKEN_SECRET', 'test-guest-upload-token-secret');
});
describe('readGuestUploadGrant', () => {
it('carries back the reservation and the declared size it was signed with', () => {
const token = createGuestUploadToken({
...SUBJECT,
providerVideoId: BUNNY_VIDEO_ID,
reservationId: 'reservation-1',
declaredSizeBytes: BigInt(4096),
});
expect(readGuestUploadGrant(token, SUBJECT, BUNNY_VIDEO_ID)).toEqual({
reservationId: 'reservation-1',
declaredSizeBytes: BigInt(4096),
});
});
// The binding that makes a guest release safe: presenting this token to cancel
// deletes the upload it stands for, so it cannot be used to drop the hold of
// an upload that is still running.
it('refuses a grant presented against a different provider video', () => {
const token = createGuestUploadToken({
...SUBJECT,
providerVideoId: BUNNY_VIDEO_ID,
reservationId: 'reservation-1',
});
expect(readGuestUploadGrant(token, SUBJECT, 'bunnyvideo-2-abcdefgh')).toBeNull();
expect(readGuestUploadGrant(token, SUBJECT, null)).toBeNull();
expect(verifyGuestUploadToken(token, SUBJECT, 'bunnyvideo-2-abcdefgh')).toBe(false);
});
it('still refuses a grant for another subject, bound video or not', () => {
const token = createGuestUploadToken({
...SUBJECT,
providerVideoId: BUNNY_VIDEO_ID,
reservationId: 'reservation-1',
});
expect(
readGuestUploadGrant(token, { ...SUBJECT, videoId: 'video-2' }, BUNNY_VIDEO_ID)
).toBeNull();
expect(readGuestUploadGrant(token, { ...SUBJECT, intent: 'image' }, BUNNY_VIDEO_ID)).toBeNull();
expect(
readGuestUploadGrant(token, { ...SUBJECT, context: '198.51.100.9:public' }, BUNNY_VIDEO_ID)
).toBeNull();
});
// The image and audio grants carry none of this, and a grant issued before the
// claims existed keeps working rather than failing an upload in flight.
it('reads a grant with no claims as holding nothing', () => {
const token = createGuestUploadToken({ ...SUBJECT, intent: 'image' });
const subject = { ...SUBJECT, intent: 'image' as const };
expect(readGuestUploadGrant(token, subject)).toEqual({
reservationId: null,
declaredSizeBytes: null,
});
expect(verifyGuestUploadToken(token, subject, BUNNY_VIDEO_ID)).toBe(true);
});
it('refuses a forged signature', () => {
const token = createGuestUploadToken({
...SUBJECT,
providerVideoId: BUNNY_VIDEO_ID,
reservationId: 'reservation-1',
});
const [payload] = token.split('.');
expect(readGuestUploadGrant(`${payload}.forged`, SUBJECT, BUNNY_VIDEO_ID)).toBeNull();
});
it('reads a non-positive declared size as nothing declared', () => {
const token = createGuestUploadToken({
...SUBJECT,
providerVideoId: BUNNY_VIDEO_ID,
declaredSizeBytes: BigInt(-1),
});
expect(readGuestUploadGrant(token, SUBJECT, BUNNY_VIDEO_ID)?.declaredSizeBytes).toBeNull();
});
});