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yusufipk
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Both cookies were read straight into database columns after nothing more than a format check. httpOnly keeps JavaScript out of them and does nothing about curl, so the anonymous id was a string the caller picked: enough to write a first-touch row for a visitor who never existed, to file it under a channel of their choosing, and to claim that id's events at signup, since the backfill matches on the id alone. They are now signed with an HMAC over AUTH_SECRET, through Web Crypto rather than node:crypto because the proxy runs on the edge and the pages that read the cookies back run in Node. The first-touch body moved to base64url on the way: cookie values are percent-encoded and decoded by several layers that do not agree on how many times, and a payload carrying its own percent escapes comes back subtly different and takes the signature with it. Signing stops a caller choosing an id, not collecting one, since dropping the cookie and asking for the landing page again mints another. So the bot and prefetch filters moved to where the rows are written rather than only where the cookies are issued, which also fixes a returning visitor's prefetch of /register recording a signup start, and a per-client hourly ceiling now sits in front of the write. The ceiling is skipped when TRUSTED_PROXY_MODE is unset, where every caller resolves to 127.0.0.1 and the bucket would empty on real traffic long before it emptied on a flood. Four smaller things around it: - /api/events checked the flag and the origin after paying for a rate-limit write, so a host who never turned analytics on was still writing a row per anonymous POST. Both checks are free and now come first, and the limiter answers 204 rather than 429: a beacon has nobody to tell, and a flooder should not be handed the reset time. - /api/onboarding/source was keyed by IP on an authenticated route. Without TRUSTED_PROXY_MODE that is five answers an hour for the whole deployment, and with it a shared office address locks out everyone after one colleague answered. Keyed by account, like /api/onboarding/complete beside it. - The cookies took their Secure flag from request.nextUrl.protocol, which behind a TLS-terminating reverse proxy is the container-internal http address. It comes off the configured public origin now. - sanitizeLandingPath took anything that started with a slash, including from the cookie, so a hand-written one could put newlines and markup into a column an admin table may render one day. Also: the paid-account query had no LIMIT and returned every active account's name and email, the growth route answered 403 where it meant 401, and the schema claimed no free text is stored when self_reported_note holds 200 characters of it.