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yusufipk
9c75ce91e1
Clicking an invitation link while signed out dropped the visitor on a bare login form, even though most invitees have no account yet and nothing on screen told them to create one. Signed-out visitors now get the invitation itself: who invited them, which workspace/project, which role, and which address it was sent to. The primary call to action follows whether an account already exists for that address — "Create your account" when it does not, "Sign in to accept" when it does. The sign-up path carries the invitation forward, so a new account lands back on the invitation and from there on the shared workspace/project instead of the onboarding wizard: - the register link passes invitationToken, the invited email and a callbackUrl - the register form locks the email to the invited address and shows what is being joined - the verification email round-trips the destination through a sanitized `next` parameter - login and verify-email keep the pending destination in their sign-in links Signing in with a different address than the one invited now explains the mismatch instead of silently redirecting to the dashboard. Callback sanitization moves to lib/safe-redirect.ts so login, register, verify-email and the verification route share one open-redirect guard.
49 lines
1.8 KiB
TypeScript
49 lines
1.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
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import { consumeVerificationToken } from '@/lib/email-verification';
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import { rateLimit } from '@/lib/rate-limit';
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import { logError } from '@/lib/logger';
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import { getPublicOrigin } from '@/lib/request-origin';
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import { getSafeCallbackUrl } from '@/lib/safe-redirect';
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// A raw 32-byte hex token is exactly 64 characters.
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const TOKEN_REGEX = /^[0-9a-f]{64}$/;
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export async function GET(request: NextRequest) {
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// Redirect targets must be built from the public origin, not `request.url`:
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// behind a reverse proxy the latter is the container-internal address and the
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// user lands on a dead host even though verification succeeded.
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const origin = getPublicOrigin(request);
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const redirectTo = (path: string) => NextResponse.redirect(new URL(path, origin));
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try {
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// Rate-limit by IP to prevent token enumeration attacks.
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const limited = await rateLimit(request, 'verify-email');
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if (limited) return limited;
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const token = request.nextUrl.searchParams.get('token');
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if (!token || !TOKEN_REGEX.test(token.trim())) {
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return redirectTo('/login?error=InvalidVerificationToken');
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}
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const email = await consumeVerificationToken(token.trim());
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if (!email) {
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return redirectTo('/login?error=InvalidVerificationToken');
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}
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// Keep the post-verification destination (e.g. an invitation) if one was carried along.
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const next = getSafeCallbackUrl(request.nextUrl.searchParams.get('next'), {
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origin,
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fallback: '',
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});
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return redirectTo(
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next ? `/login?verified=true&callbackUrl=${encodeURIComponent(next)}` : '/login?verified=true'
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);
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} catch (err) {
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logError('Email verification error:', err);
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return redirectTo('/login?error=VerificationFailed');
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}
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}
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