Files
OpenFrame/app/invitations/accept/page.tsx
T
yusufipk b1aed03fca fix(invitations): throttle unauthenticated invitation lookups and harden redirects
The invitation preview surfaces (/invitations/accept and /register?invitationToken=) are the
only unauthenticated reads of invitation data, and each render costs two database queries.
They are now rate limited before the lookup can touch the database: a generous per-IP bucket
that bounds enumeration across tokens, plus a tight per-IP+token bucket that stops repeated
probing of a single invitation. Tokens are hashed before they reach the rate_limits table.

A throttled lookup says so ("we couldn't check this invitation right now") instead of claiming
the invitation is invalid, and signed-in acceptance is not gated by it.

The callback sanitizer also checked only the origin, which is not enough: an attacker can
smuggle a host into the path of an otherwise same-origin URL — new URL('https://app/​/evil.com')
keeps our origin but yields a pathname of //evil.com, which navigation sinks resolve as
protocol-relative and follow off-site. Paths are now required to be rooted at a single slash,
and the login redirect re-checks at the sink.

getClientIp is split so server components that only have `await headers()` resolve the client
IP through the same trusted-proxy logic as route handlers.
2026-07-25 19:39:16 +07:00

96 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript

import { redirect } from 'next/navigation';
import { auth } from '@/lib/auth';
import { db } from '@/lib/db';
import { acceptInvitationTokenForUser, getInvitationPreviewByToken } from '@/lib/invitations';
import { isInvitationPreviewAllowed } from '@/lib/invitation-preview-limit';
import {
InvitationAccountMismatch,
InvitationLanding,
InvitationRateLimited,
} from './invitation-landing';
interface InvitationAcceptPageProps {
searchParams: Promise<{
token?: string;
}>;
}
export default async function InvitationAcceptPage({ searchParams }: InvitationAcceptPageProps) {
const resolvedSearchParams = await searchParams;
const token = resolvedSearchParams.token?.trim();
if (!token) {
redirect('/login?error=invalid_invitation');
}
const session = await auth();
if (!session?.user?.id) {
// Signed-out visitors get the invitation itself instead of a bare login form:
// most of them have no account yet and need to be told to create one. This is the
// only unauthenticated read of invitation data, so it is IP-throttled.
if (!(await isInvitationPreviewAllowed(token))) {
return <InvitationRateLimited />;
}
const preview = await getInvitationPreviewByToken(token);
return <InvitationLanding token={token} preview={preview} />;
}
const invitation = await db.invitation.findUnique({
where: { token },
select: {
id: true,
email: true,
status: true,
scope: true,
workspaceId: true,
projectId: true,
},
});
function redirectToInvitationTarget(inviteStatus: string) {
if (invitation?.scope === 'WORKSPACE' && invitation.workspaceId) {
redirect(`/workspaces/${invitation.workspaceId}?invite=${inviteStatus}`);
}
if (invitation?.scope === 'PROJECT' && invitation.projectId) {
redirect(`/projects/${invitation.projectId}?invite=${inviteStatus}`);
}
}
const userEmail = session.user.email?.toLowerCase().trim();
if (!userEmail) {
redirect('/dashboard?invite=invalid_email');
}
const result = await acceptInvitationTokenForUser({
token,
userId: session.user.id,
email: userEmail,
});
if (result === 'accepted') {
redirectToInvitationTarget('accepted');
redirect('/dashboard?invite=accepted');
}
if (result === 'expired') {
redirectToInvitationTarget('expired');
redirect('/dashboard?invite=expired');
}
if (result === 'forbidden') {
// Signed in with a different address than the one invited — say so instead of
// dropping the user on the dashboard with no explanation.
return (
<InvitationAccountMismatch
invitedEmail={invitation?.email ?? 'another address'}
signedInEmail={userEmail}
/>
);
}
if (result === 'not_found' && invitation?.status === 'ACCEPTED') {
redirectToInvitationTarget('already_accepted');
}
redirect('/dashboard?invite=not_found');
}